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The importance that policy-makers nominally
give to history is more than evident in contem-
porary writing. Addressing the enigma of U.S.
energy policy, Brookings Institute President Bruce
MacLaury writes:
... extremely complex problems often defy analyt-
ical probing, and past experience may represent the
best and most reliable source of evidence about cur-
rent policy alternatives. History may thus compen-
sate partially for the social scientists’ well-known
shortage of laboratory evidenced 1
Similarly, in a recent issue of Science, Technol-
ogy, & Human Valuers, Bruce Mazlish turns to
&dquo;historical analogies&dquo; and &dquo;case studies&dquo; to help
place science indicators in perspective. For Maz-
lish, history not only provides the laboratory evi-
dence called for by MacLaury but also humanizes
cold-hard facts; &dquo;case studies give us the im-
mediate human decisions, the nuts and bolts of
specific pieces of science and technology, and are
invaluable in reminding us of the nitty-gritty real-
ity behind our clean figures and our soaring anal-
ogies. ,,2 Humans always have looked to the past
to solve their problems.’ If present trends are any
indication, they always will.
It does not follow from this generalization,
however, that historians play key roles in con-
temporary policy-making circles. In fact, there is
not even any general belief today that the his-
torical knowledge we regularly use when reach-
ing decisions ought to be supplied by historians.
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MacLaury is content to direct a group of econo-
mists &dquo;with a long-standing interest in the his-
tory of economic policy&dquo; to collect the data
needed for decision-making about future energy
policy. Mazlish, who is himself an historian and
has championed the application of historical
analogy to contemporary problems, lists only &dquo;a
natural scientist, a political scientist, and an an-
thropologist&dquo; as the team needed to pursue case
studies. Our society understands that chemists
do chemistry and economists do economics, but
does not seem to recognize that history must be
done by historians.
Historians’ absence from contemporary policy-
making circles is to some degree understandable.
Most of the historical information needed to
make decisions comes from the recent past. This
is particularly true for decisions involving science
and technology. The origins of the scientific men-
tality may be centuries old, but the problems that
today draw in science and technology more com-
monly have their immediate origins in post World
War II developments and must first be understood
within that context and time frame. Most his-
torians have, however, shied away from research-
ing events that are only a few decades old. His-
torians of science exhibit considerable bias against
the study of contemporary science, hoping thereby
to avoid &dquo;whiggish&dquo; pitfalls. This trend is sig-
nificant enough to prompt Loren Graham to urge
his colleagues to put aside their fears of &dquo;whig-
gishness&dquo; and learn to dance &dquo;contemporary
ballet
Some historians have attempted to argue for
the relevance of history to policy-making, but
without much success. Marx Wartofsky, for ex-
ample, feels that &dquo;the metasciences&dquo; [i. e., the
history, philosophy, and sociology of science]
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have not made &dquo;anything more than a slight rip-
ple in the pond of ongoing scientific research,&dquo;
and have had little effect on broader policy is-
sues-not &dquo;even a ripple in the larger ocean of
human concerns of a more immediate and prac-
tical sorts In other words, the arguments for
relevance, for the utility of history, have been
made but not heard. Why has history been unable
to gain a position of importance in the nuts-and-
bolts world of policy-making? I suggest that
historians have perhaps been trying out for the
wrong parts.
Traditional Arguments
for the Utility of History
The past provides ideal ground for exercising
the mind and training it to think about content
porary problems. In addition, this exercise takes
place in neutral surroundings, training students
to avoid one-sidedness. &dquo;Science undergradu-
ates,&dquo; Graham suggests, &dquo;approach contemporary
problems such as human genetics with much
greater insights if they have already studied pre-
vious controversies in the field, such as Darwin-
ism and Social Darwinism.&dquo;6 Presumably the
same would follow for policy-makers, were they
better versed in the history of science. Thomas
Kuhn, while admitting that &dquo;a clearer grasp of
the nature of scientific development is unlikely
to resolve particular puzzles of research,&dquo; sug-
gests that this knowledge &dquo;may stimulate recon-
sideration of such matters as science education,
administration, and policy. &dquo;’ Beyond this, his-
torical knowledge not only rounds but shapes. In
the words of Augustine, history may permit
someone to advance from talking about &dquo;what
has been done&dquo; to &dquo;what ought to be done or
observed, using the boldness of an advisor, not
the fidelity of a narrator.&dquo;’ This view of the role
of history has gained in popularity as so-called
external factors occupy increasingly more im-
portant roles in histories of science.
Having discovered that science and technology
are in many ways tied to social, economic, po-
litical, and cultural roots, historians have begun
to urge decision-makers to pay more attention to
such factors. Graham regards &dquo;the fact that in
recent debates over the history of science the
’externalists’ have won a legitimate place for
themselves alongside the ’internalists’,&dquo; as &dquo;filled
with meaning for the consideration of current
socio-political problems involving science and
technology.&dquo; Wartofsky looks at the same his-
torical studies as providing &dquo;a normative critical
assessment of the relations between state, class
interest, ideology, and the sciences.&dquo; The impli-
cation of both statements is clear. The past pro-
vides a controlling perspective from which t1)
view the present. Historians and other &dquo;meta-
scientists&dquo; are not simply critics, but &dquo;norma-
tive&dquo; critics, who can advise as well as naffate.’
I should not overstress the extent to which
historians have attempted to occupy advisory
roles. Wartofsky cautions that &dquo;the metasciences
are in no special way fitted to advise or formulate
in the domain of applied social questions of sci-
ence ... , no more than movie actors or sports
heroes are fitted to make pronouncements upon,
or to give leadership in, matters of public policy.&dquo;
Historians cannot provide direct advice on policy
matters. Rather, Wartofsky removes the meta-
sciences one step from the decision-making pro-
cess, to a position where they can provide a &dquo;sec-
ond-order critique of the forms and practices of
applied rationality. &dquo;lo In plainer terms, viewed
in this light historians become resident critics;
the part being applied for is that of a normative
conscience,&dquo; &dquo;provocateur,&dquo; or &dquo;wise person.&dquo;
Given such justifications, it is not difficult to
understand why policy-makers have not flocked
to historians for advice. The justification is itself
laudable (and one with which I happen to agree
in principle), but it is not easily sold. Most policy-
makers do not need (or want) yet another con-
science looking over their shoulders while they
make decisions,.&dquo; There is no lack of &dquo;second-
order&dquo; critics to point out shortcomings and to
suggest new creative approaches to problem solv-
ing. Policy-makers faced with specific, tangible
problems need workable models and useful facts.
The history of science as currently urged upon
policy-makers provides neither of these ingredients.
Although historians of science have over the
years attempted to reduce historical explanation
to simple, uniform parameters, the resulting
models have not yet been shown to have much
utility. In the 1960s and early 1970s, Kuhn’s sug-
gestions about paradigms seemed to have promise
for widespread applicability to other disciplines
and even to policy-making, but substantive cri-
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tiques from both philosophers and historians
have left its status as a policy tool very much in
doubt. Nor has extemalist thinking developed
such that its generalizations are widely enough
accepted to be used for problem solving. There
may be a partial consensus that external factors
are &dquo;important,&dquo; but there is no agreement yet
on &dquo;important for what.&dquo; The past may provide
fertile ground for growing critics, but it is not
solid enough ground for erecting policy-making
structures. Until this situation changes, the &dquo;les-
sons&dquo; of history will be difficult to apply in any
constructive way in decision-making.
, However, it is in the area of factual information
that the history of science may be able to make
more substantial contributions to policy-making
than it has to date. To illustrate, I will describe
a case study that shows how history has been
misused, abused, and neglected in the policy field.
For Example-History
and the Microwave Debate
One decision that policy-makers regularly face
is how to deal with the environmental changes
wrought by ongoing scientific/technological in-
novations and industrial application. Any num-
ber of consequences of scientific and technolog-
ical development can affect the lives of millions
of people, either harmfully or beneficially, and
so change the course of civilization. This being
the case, such developments must be regulated
either when they are introduced or when their
environmental consequences are discovered to be
significant.
Non-ionizing electromagnetic radiation (radio-
waves and microwaves, hereafter generally re-
ferred to as &dquo;RF&dquo; radiation) achieved the dubious
distinction of &dquo;potential environmental hazard&dquo;
during World War ll.’2 New, shorter &dquo;micro-
waves&dquo; were developed just prior to the war and
were subsequently used during the war in radar
technology. Because large doses of RF energy were
known to heat human tissue, these and other
post-war uses raised questions about the amount
of RF radiation humans could tolerate without
suffering adverse effects. Some of the biological
effects that have been suggested include cata-
racts, headaches, and disturbances of the heart,
as well as more long-term effects such as leu-
kemia or brain tumors. Ever since that time, pol-
icy-makers in military and regulatory govern-
ment agencies and in many private organizations
have grappled with the problems posed by in-
creasing levels of RF radiation in the environ-
ment, trying to ascertain &dquo;how much is too
much?&dquo; To date, they have yet to formulate a
satisfactory solution to this problem. As this ar-
ticle goes to press, there are major industrial proj-
ects that are being held in abeyance for want of
a definitive RF radiation policy.l3
The pattern that policy-makers followed over
the years is a familiar one. The search for policy
commonly begins as a response to a crisis-for
example, to the discovery of possible health haz-
ards, to the erosion of public confidence, or to
the enactment of controversial legislation. Once
activated, the policy-making process usually turns
to background, to the process of getting &dquo;a thor-
ough picture of what the story is&dquo; (to quote the
chairman of a 1953 Navy conference on RF bioef-
fects).14 If a crisis has arisen, it must have an
origin. In 1973, Senate policy-makers held hear-
ings to determine how the legislation that was
drawn up in 1968 to solve the microwave problem
&dquo;has functioned since its passage.&dquo; Five years
later, similar concerns prompted the same re-
sponse, as the Senate renewed its deliberations
on the microwave and other related problems by
asking &dquo;how the [1968 Radiation Control for
Health and Safety] Act has been implemented.&dquo;15
Policy-making for the future more often than not
begins by looking back in time; it begins with
history.
The persons called to supply the background
information needed for most policy decisions are
usually not historians. The reason for this is ob-
vious. Information on events only a few decades
ago can be obtained directly from the partici-
pants. When key figures are still alive, there is
no apparent need to turn to historians. For in-
formation on the implementation of legislation,
government officials can be called to testify. If
the present state of scientific knowledge is crucial
for setting policy, practicing scientists can fill in
the details on the evolution of the relevant fields.
If public concern is thought to have bearing on
the decisions, then spokespersons (usually self-
proclaimed) for the public can put in appearances.
Unfortunately, reliance on participants rather
than trained observers can seriously distort the
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information that policy-makers need when mak-
ing decisions. Some distortions are obvious, even
at the time, but most are not. As a result, many
policy decisions are based on incomplete or ques-
tionable information. Some specific examples
may help to describe just how serious the con-
sequences of this situation can be.
Misin f ortriat~&copy;r~
The mass media regularly bombard the public
with many varieties of uncritiqued information,
making much more difficult the task of sorting
out fact from fiction in order to make a decision-
e.g., should a building variance be granted to al-
low a major corporation to build an FM radio
tower or TV uplink facility in a residential area?
The mass media often present information in
ways designed to achieve definite, prejudged goals.
Today’s microwave debate can, for example, be
traced directly to a few, uncritical popular sources,
such as Paul Brodeur’s articles in The New Yorker
(later published as the book Zapping of America),
Jack Anderson’s reports in the &dquo;Washington Merry-
go-Round&dquo; column, and the courtroom and public
statements of a Scarsdale (NY) ophthalmologist,
Milton Zaret. While each of these sources used
some reliable information, each also dissemi-
nated errors, both in judgment and in fact. The
public, then, has the arduous task of deciding
where truth lies. One group that undertook such
a task, a Board of Adjustment in Rockaway Town-
ship, Nj, struggled through many months of a
fact-finding expedition that, in the end, did not
&dquo;discover&dquo; anything. 16
Although misinformation may particularly
trouble the public, it is by no means found only
there. In the 1960s, the State Department as a
matter of policy (for reasons of national security)
misinformed its employees and representatives
of other government agencies about the purpose
of medical tests being given to personnel in the
American Embassy in Moscow. The tests’ actual
purpose was to determine whether the micro-
wave radiation that the Russians were beaming
at the Embassy presented a health hazard. The
announced purpose of the tests was to study the
effects of possible &dquo;viral contaminants&dquo; in the
Moscow environment. 17 In this particular case,
the misinformation resulted in a lack of infor-
mation. Policy-makers outside the State Depart-
ment were not informed about the &dquo;Moscow sig-
nal&dquo; until 1976, 12 years after the &dquo;Moscow Viral
Study&dquo; was begun a situation that, in turn, de-
layed serious consideration of subtle biological
effects for almost a decade.
A more common form of misinformation re-
sults from the willingness of some experts to
overstep the bounds of their expertise. For ex-
ample, in 1968, an industrial spokesman claimed
in written testimony at a Senate hearing that
microwave hazards posed few problems because
&dquo;man has a built-in alarm system coupled with
his threshold of pain that protects him from ther-
mal injury.&dquo; Although at the time scientists
knew this statement was inaccurate, the lawyer
who made the statement did not. Twelve years
later, Representative Elizabeth Holtzman (for a
while a prime mover for strict RF standards) told
her fellow members that &dquo;the present voluntary
standard really has nothing to do with empirical
science,&dquo; even though empirical evidence has
been used to set RF standards since the early
1950s. Some critics may disagree with this evi-
dence and how it has been used, but the standard
setting process has not lacked empiricism.18
Misinformed statements made in public-such
as heresay evidence and off-the-top-of-the-head
conclusions-can exert telling influences, in open
meetings, during consulting sessions, at hearings,
and even in the course of normal conversations.
This is particularly true if the speaker is well-
respected. It is not at all unusual to have new
work dismissed in open meetings on the basis of
the word of a single authority who may or may
not be completely familiar with the work in ques-
tion. A simple statement of: &dquo;Oh, that experi-
ment, it had very poor controls and the mea-
surement techniques were sloppy,&dquo; can discredit
work before it gets a full hearing.
Missing Information
Over the years, research and policy-making on
the effects of microwaves has been hampered by
the absence of a number of key pieces of infor-
mation. Policy-makers know, for example, that
in the 1950s the Russians set their RF exposure
standard 1000 times below the U.S. standard (at
IO f.Lw/cm2. as opposed to the U.S. level of 10 mw/
cm2.). To this day, the same policy-makers do not
fully understand why the Soviet standard was set
so low.19
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An even more troublesome exaxnple can be
found much closer to home,, Shortly after the
American National Standards Institute set its
first voluntary RF standard in 1966 (ANSI C95.1-
1966), the chairman of the committee that had
drawn up the standard resigned his position. Two
years later when a new chairman was appointed,
he discovered that he could find &dquo;little infor-
mation&dquo; about the events leading to the first stan-
dard. By turning to colleagues who had actually
served on the original committee, he was able to
assemble some records, but they were filled with
holes. Commenting on records received from his
most reliable source, he noted that &dquo;apparently
this must not be the complete file for the com-
mittee activities since there is a jump between
1961 and 1963 *&dquo;2-0
The result of this situation was considerable
disagreement on the significance and intent of
the first standard, which could possibly have been
avoided by turning to an historian. Letters giving
insights into the thinking behind the standards
do survive; minutes from the early ANSI meet-
ings are squirreled away in long-forgotten file
drawers; and personal recollections can be re-
corded. Although it is not always easy to locate
this information, careful studies can supply many
of the missing pieces and fill in the foundation
for policy-making.21
Partial Information
Even when the available information is rela-
tively complete, policy-making rarely proceeds
on the basis of the complete record. Fact gath-
ering requires selection and condensation. The
testimony that experts supply at hearings and in
reports is simply partial information that sup-
posedly (the strength of the supposition depends
on the expert reliability) faithfully represents
the fuller record.
Partial information is particularly significant
for reporting the results of scientific experiments.
Often what has not been discovered or could not
have been discovered is as important as what has
been discovered. For example, an epidemiological
study of persons who worked in the Moscow em-
bassy during the years of microwave bombard-
ment discovered &dquo;no convincing evidence ...
that would directly implicate the exposure to
microwave radiation ... in the causation of any
adverse health effects.&dquo; It is also true-but less
often reported-that the same epidemiological
study did not and could not have ruled out mi-
crowave-related health effects. The survey pop-
ulation was statistically too small and the survey
data too close to the period of maximum exposure
for subtle changes to be detected.22 In other
words, the study could not have detected either
minor-incidence or long-term effects. In cases
such as these, the full story must include both
the positive and negative findings. Either piece
of information alone would distort the picture
and establish policy-making on a false foundation.
Value-laden Information
Misinformation, missing information, and par-
tial information represent value-neutral descrip-
tions of the ways in which policy-makers can
distort the background. When these distortions
arise for particular reasons, they give rise to
biased or value-laden information.
There is nothing mysterious about the way in
which values enter into the fact-gathering pro-
cess. Experts making history have opinions on
future courses, and they have definite preferences
for particular policy options. Accordingly, when
called upon to give background information, they
may do so in ways that lead to their preferred
policy options. They shape the past so that it
leads logically to one particular future. In so
doing, they necessarily interject values into their
descriptions, reports, testimony, and other his-
torical narratives.
A Washington state environmental impact
statement (EIS) drawn up in response to citizen
concems about the possible health threats posed
by a satellite uplink facility illustrates how easily
values can be mixed with facts when policy and
history become intertwined. Although industry-
written, the EIS was required by law to present
an objective overview of, among other factors,
possible adverse health effects. The final EIS did
not succeed in meeting this requirement. The
document presented to policy-makers in March
1982 is filled with value judgments that could
render the entire document useless for policy-
making ; for example, &dquo;Neither the experimental
research nor the epidemiological studies that
have been conducted support a claim of risk [at
the levels of exposure eventuated by the proposed
facility
The equation of risk with scientific experi-
ments clearly requires a judgmental act and there-
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fore involves values. Scientific experiments yield
factual observationsr-r~ts exposed to low doses
of microwave radiation do or do not exhibit spe-
cific effects. Whether these effects then can or
cannot be said to &dquo;support a claim of risk&dquo; de-
pends on the definitions of &dquo;support&dquo; and &dquo;risk&dquo;
being used. &dquo;Support&dquo; and &dquo;risk&dquo; are not objec-
tive endpoints. At best they may be defined le-
gally or by consensus, but even this is seldom
the case. The seemingly bland pronouncement
that &dquo;a look back at what science has accom-
plished leads to a conclusion that&dquo; is, in fact, a
value-laden statement masquerading as objective
historical narrative. This statement’s historical
focus can be discerned by comparing it with a
statement such as &dquo;neither the scholastic lectures
of Nicole Oresme nor the metaphysical explo-
rations of Nicholas of Cusa support the claim
that the theory of diurnal rotation was taken se-
riously before the time of Copernicus.&dquo;
Astute policy-makers may, of course, recognize
such value judgments and weigh them when
making decisions. They can also be alert to gaps
in the record, one-sided reporting, and other dis-
tortions in the supposed objective background
presented to them. However, to assume that cor-
rectives will be introduced undermines the whole
purpose of objective fact gathering. The historical
background should clarify knotty problems, not
confuse or complicate them.
What changes would improve the accuracy and
reliability of historical fact gathering for policy-
making in general? One immediate suggestion for
change would be to involve historians more ac-
tively. In the next section, I suggest how this
might be accomplished and discuss some of the
problems that will undoubtedly be encountered
along the way.
Suggestions and Observations
The most direct way to involve history in pol-
icy-making is to involve historians-as opposed
to scientists, economists, politicians, lawyers,
and others. My own experience in the microwave
field, working jointly with a physicist and a phys-
iologist, entails just this sort of involvement. Our
team has undertaken a detailed analysis of several
controversial aspects of the development of the
microwave field. Our motivations were initially
personal and professional. We had used the mi-
crowave debate in a science-values class to in-
troduce students to the intricacies of the modem
environmental dilemma; but the more we read
about the debate in the secondary literature, the
less sense it made, yet the issues raised seemed
significant enough to warrant a closer analysis.
Fortunately, the NSF Program in Ethics and Val-
ues in Science and Technology (EVIST) agreed
and the study began-initially as an effort to learn
rather than to influence or advise.
Our focus on policy came later, when we dis-
covered that, as outsiders, we could see problems
and had background information that the internal
experts had missed. It took time to persuade the
experts in the field that we might have something
of value to contribute. Our first publication in
Science magazine had several interesting en-
counters on its way through the review process,
and a conference investigating the applicability
of cost/benefit analysis to the RF bioeffects field
did not immediately enroll a full list of major
participants. Eventually the experts and major
policy figures did agree to assemble in Ann Arbor,
MI, and talk about the future in terms of cost/
benefit analysis.24 Undoubtedly, more discussion
and perhaps more dialogue will follow. For ex-
ample, a comment we recently prepared on the
environmental impact statement mentioned above
has as its objective to elevate the quality of back-
ground discussion.&dquo; Whether it will have this
effect, of course, remains to be seen.
Our research experience suggests that history
and historians can be more directly involved in
policy-making. For such involvement to be ef-
fected on any larger scale, two formidable obsta-
cles-one professional, the other financial-must
be overcome, not only in our case but as a general
working procedure in policy-making.
The professional obstacles are of two types-
internal and external. Internally, the historical
profession does not encourage its professionals
to participate in policy-making. Were this not the
case, Graham’s comments on &dquo;contemporary bal-
let&dquo; would not have been necessary. Because it
is true, it is unlikely that large numbers of his-
torians will move into the policy field, even if
it becomes clear that they can contribute some-
thing valuable.
The skepticism about whether the historian
can say anything of interest to persons grappling
with contemporary problems is widespread and
111
deeply rooted, and it will remain so until histo-
rians establish a solid record of contributions to
policy development, by demonstrating not only
quality but relevance.
The lack of professional encouragement, both
internal and external, bears directly on the fi-
nancial opportunities open for historians working
on policy. Programs such as EVIST encourage
new approaches and innovation, but E~iS’~’’s
funds are extremely limited in comparison to the
amounts regularly spent in the policy field itself
on background studies. If not actually responsible
for background studies, historians can at least
advise on research formats used to collect back-
ground information. More joint history-policy
Ph.D. programs can be encouraged, as they are
now in a few universities. History Ph.D.s can be
directed toward work as research associates on
policy-oriented projects.
Policy-making is a mundane, down-to-earth
activity. As a consequence, the degree to which
history can succeed in aiding policy-making will
depend on the degree to which it can function
as a fact-gathering skill and not as a provocative
intellectual discipline. Although historians may
gain new insights from debating the merits of
paradigms and internal versus external explana-
tions of historical change, the outcome of these
debates has little direct bearing on practical pol-
icy decisions. History provides complete, accu-
rate, and unbiased reconstructions of the past,
whether that past is centuries old or yesterday.
On this basis, applied history can and should be
justified. This is the part for which historians of
science should try out if they are to perform in
&dquo;contemporary ballet.&dquo;
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